intellectual property

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All images here are taken of from a copy Lady Chatterley’s Lover, owned and housed by Special Collections, University of Virginia Library. The images here presented in no way infringe on the copyright of the work and are consistent with the “Use, Reproduction, and Publication of Materials” guidelines outlined by the Special Collection Library.

Rare Book School

I was recently fortunate enough to attend a course during the first session of UVA’s Rare Book School on Printed Books Since 1800. The course was great and I highly recommend it; the particular advantage of the course (and, from what I understand, of all RBS courses) is the hands-on experience with a broad variety of materials. Most of the material covered in the course is presented with greater thoroughness in Philip Gaskell’s monumental A New Introduction to Bibliography. But what even the most attentive reading of Gaskell can’t get you is the experience of handling type, or of seeing a variety of different items arranged all in one place for comparison and handling: different bindings, different illustration processes, et cetera. This is the great strength of RBS. The diversity of the audience was also a virtue of the class; scholars, librarians, and book-sellers are all in attendance, and their different attitudes proved genuinely surprising.

The hands-on nature of RBS makes it difficult to pass the experience along (in tweets, for example, or a blog post). Part of the week, though, is spent on an independent bibliography project, attending to the bibliographic detail of a single book object. I used the opportunity afforded by the RBS class to have a look at a pirate edition of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The result, I think, helped deepen my understanding of Lawrence’s fascinating appeal to the materiality of printed books in his essay A Propos of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover,” and also provided an interesting insight into the intersection between the history of obscenity and the history of reading.

A Funereal Volume

Book piracy is a fascinating topic in general and it is crucially important to any understanding of the history of obscenity. While many works were pirated with great frequency (Sherlock Holmes stories, the Oxford Edition of the Bible, etc; major British works were ripe for American piracy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though an informal courtesy system among publishers kept this from growing out of control), book piracy and obscenity thrived together in the early twentieth century. In part this is because they both used the same semi-legitimate channels of distribution and sale. It was also a peculiar effect of Anglo-American copyright law which offered no protection for “obscene” works.

No individual case better illustrates this confluence of obscenity law and copyright than that of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The market in pirate editions of Lawrence’s novel which emerged immediately after the first, 1928 Florentine edition of the novel was printed, prompted Lawrence to authorize a “popular edition” of the novel, printed in Paris and selling for (the relatively cheap) 60 francs. (The political geography of censorship in the early twentieth century is itself a topic worthy of analysis.) This cheap edition, bound in paper wrappers, vied (mostly unsuccessfully) with pirate editions for readers in England and America where, technically, none of the editions could be legally sold.

The popular edition was printed from a photographic copy of the Florentine edition (ironic given the way Lawrence picks out photographic reproduction for particular scorn in his discussion of piracies). To the photographically reproduced text of the novel, Lawrence prepended an essay, “My Skirmish with Jolly Roger: Written Especially as an Introduction to this Popular Edition.” This essay, in turn, would form the basis for Lawrence’s much longer reflection on Lady Chatterley, A Propos of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”. (This fact alone is worthy of greater comment; but I’ll abstain here so I can get to the pictures). In the essay Lawrence explains how the emergence of piracies necessitated the release of the Popular Edition. The essay offers a uniquely fascinating historical moment where literary history and book history (and, I’d insist, the history of obscenity) crucially inform one another.

The essay is fascinating for the degree of engagement Lawrence has with the materiality of the different volumes he discusses. Because most of these piracies were reproduced photographically from the Florentine edition, their text is identical to that of the Florentine and popular editions (they are all, in Gaskell’s terms, the same “edition,” a fact recognized in Gertzman’s truly impressive bibliography). And so, in distinguishing them, Lawrence appeals to the physical properties of the book itself, drawing distinctions between the various states and issues (though Lawrence doesn’t use these terms) based on the quality of printing and the physical experience of holding the volume.

I spend quite a bit of time with this interesting argument in my dissertation. At RBS, though, I wanted to focus on just one of these piracies; the one of which Lawrence writes:

I have had in my hand a very funereal volume, bound in black and elongated to look like a Bible or long hymn-book, gloomy . . . it is a sinister volume―like Captain Kidd with his face blackened, reading a sermon to those about to walk the plank. Why the pirate should have elongated the page, by adding a false page-heading, I don’t know. The effect is peculiarly depressing, high-brow. (305)

UVA’s Special Collections owns a number of pirate editions of Lady Chatterley including the “Faro” edition published by Samuel Roth (which has a reasonable claim to being the chief way in which the novel reached the American reading public during the period between 1928 and 1959). They are also in possession of the New York piracy which Lawrence describes as “Funereal.”

In discussing piracies, Lawrence at no point appeals to the discourse of intellectual property. This may be simply tactical: because the work was obscene, US and British copyright law offered no real avenue for Lawrence to assert his rights (additionally, the work was not printed in the US as required by US copyright law at the time making any such claim moot… but these are tertiary issues I think). In my dissertation I argue that Lawrence’s focus on the book’s materiality is not simply a tactical response to piracy. But whatever the undergirding logic of Lawrence’s appeal to the materiality of these volumes, it is fascinating to see the “Priest of Love” suddenly turn bibliographer (without losing any of the vehemence of his convictions).

Lady Chatterley's Lover (PR6023 .A93 L28 1928e). Special Collections, University of Virginia.

Here, for instance, are the running heads which the New York piracy has added to the text (note the lack of alignment between the pages; an instance of the shoddiness of work Lawrence complains of elsewhere in “My Skirmish”). Lawrence celebrates the simple craftsmanship of the Florentine edition. The running heads adulterate that simplicity by unnecessarily complicating the page. While I haven’t been able to do a side by side comparison with the Florentine edition (the UVA library does not own this rare item), the “Funereal” edition does expand the size of the pages slightly (Gertzman measures the leaves of the piracy at 9 5/8″ x 6 1/4″ while Roberts measures the Florentine editions at 8 15/16″ x 6 3/8″, a discrepancy of nearly three quarters of an inch in page height; I think one would need direct examination to compare whether the type-size was at all affected by the process of reproduction.)

Title Page of New York Piracy of Lady Chatterley's Lover

Lady Chatterley's Lover (PR6023 .A93 L28 1928e). Special Collections, University of Virginia.

The title page features a truly bizarre eagle vignette which seems to oddly echo Lawrence’s own phoenix. It seems more appropriate to an elementary school American History textbook than to Lady Chatterley’s Lover.

Smeary Printing in New York Pirate Edition of Lady Chatterley's Lover

Lady Chatterley's Lover (PR6023 .A93 L28 1928e). Special Collections, University of Virginia.

And as Lawrence complains elsewhere in the essay, the printing is rather shabbily done, resulting in a smeary text. It is these differences (rather than any difference in the text itself) which for Lawrence mark the piracy as “gloomy” and “high brow.”

How to Read Obscenely

I spent some time with this volume largely because of the ire it elicited from Lawrence. But this particular copy proved interesting for some other reasons. Folded and placed between pages 200 and 201 is a newspaper clipping from the Washington Herald (Dec. 24, 1929) with the headline “Smoot to Read Racy Books in Plea for Ban: Senate to Conduct Secret Session When He Takes the Floor” and a penciled list made on the rear end-paper.

The clipping details Senator Reed Smoot’s plan to read selections from a number of books books to a private session of the Senate. Smoot was interested in reversing an amedment to US Tariff passed the previous year which effectively removed the censorship authority of Customs agents. The change had been advocated by Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico (who corresponded with Ezra Pound on precisely this issue). (Further details about the debate can be found in this article from Time). Smoot hoped this reading would senators of the perniciousness of works that had previously been “excluded by the customs authorities” (chief among them a work the clipping describes as “Lady Chatterton’s Lover”). Echoing James Douglas’s infamous statement two years earlier (that he would rather give a child prussic acid than a copy of The Well of Loneliness), Smoot claimed that he would “rather have a child of mine use opium than read these books.”

In the end Smoot never read his selections to a closed Senate committee. Instead a compromise was reached, by which customs officers could turn books over to district courts who could pursue censorship through existing obscene statutes.

The clipping however notes the following: “The tall, austere, Mormon elder will read to the Senate—in secret session—passages he has culled from the racy and spicy books…” (my emphasis).

This strategy, of culling particularly “racy” and “spicy” passages from books in order to prove that they are “obscene” was a common among those who wished to censor books. The larger tendency throughout the twentieth century was in the opposite direction. The gradual process by which controversial works (from Ulysses to Lolita and Naked Lunch) were admitted into the domain of “literature” proceeded first by insisting on the unity of the work as a whole. Judge Woolsey, deciding that Ulysses is not obscene in 1933, writes: “reading ‘Ulysses’ in its entirety, as a book must be read on such a test as this, did not tend to excite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts” (xiii, my emphasis). (One wonders, could any novel of 800 pages manage to so excite “in its entirety”?). The process of art/literature and pornography becoming antithetical by definition (to be obscene a work must, in the language of Miller v. California “lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”) proceeds by first insisting that (again, the language of the Miller test) be “taken as a whole.”

What, of course, this suggests is that the question of obscenity is less a question about a work than it is about a way of reading. To ask, therefore, whether or not a particular work is obscene reifies a question which is really about how a work was read. The question of obscenity is not chiefly a matter of gauging the sexual explicitness of a text, but of understanding the uses to which literature is put and the types of reading that are recognized as literary (and those which are a priori non-literary). At least one hallmark of obscene reading is its disregard for the whole.

Pencil List on Rear End-Paper of Pirate Copy of Lady Chatterley's Lover

Lady Chatterley's Lover (PR6023 .A93 L28 1928e). Special Collections, University of Virginia.

And, turning to the rear end papers of this particular copy of Lawrence’s novel, one finds evidence of exactly this sort of reading: a list of penciled in numbers which, a casual perusal suggests, correspond to the “spicier” moments in the novel.

The tantalizing question is who made this list and to what end? In their style of reading, at least, the reader looking simply for pornographic enjoyment and the antivice crusader share a similar disregard for regarding the work “in its entirety.” This penciled list of passages culled from this edition, together with the clipping describing Sen. Smoot’s own culling, suggests a practice of reading at odds with that which would be recieve the blessing of judicial authority first, three years later, by Judge Woolsey and later enshrined in U. S. obscenity law.

Works Cited

  • Gertzman, Jay. A Descriptive Bibliography of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”: With Essays Toward A Publishing History of the Novel. NY: Greenwood P, 1989.
  • Lawrence, D. H. Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Apropos of “Lady Chatterley’s Lover.” Edited by Michael Squires. Cambridge Edition of the Letters and Works of D. H. Lawrence. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.
  • Roberts, Warren and Paul Poplawski. A Bibliography of the D. H. Lawrence. 3rd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
  • Woolsey, John M. Decision in United States v. One Book called “Ulysses.” In Ulysses by James Joyce. New York: Vintage International, 1990. ix – xiv.

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In a great, collectively authored post at Profhacker, Janine Utell observes the comparative dearth of tweets concerning our shared field. “There was a silence, a whistling void where there should have been voices: where were the literature folks, people doing research, giving and listening to papers in my area? Where are my fellow modernists, commenting on what we were all learning at the convention?” I felt a particular pang of guilt.

While I attended plenty of panels at MLA this year, I didn’t tweet too much (that is, at all). While there are technological reasons for my relative silence (anyone want to give me a Droid?), the primary reason I didn’t tweet more is because of my assumption that only Digital Humanities folks follow MLA on twitter (not, say, modernists). I mean, what is the sense of tweeting a panel on Pound into a whistling void? But, of course, if there was a whistling void it is at least partially (though probably only partially) my fault. As Janine’s comment makes clear, there are actually a good bunch of modernists already on twitter. So, inspired by Janine’s comment (and the excellent write-up of the Legacy of David Foster Wallace Panel by Kathleen Fitzpatrick, which I was sure had me up at 8:30 Wednesday), here is a quick digest of my notes from MLA, with all snark and doodles redacted, made in atonement for my silence.

I haven’t included all my notes for all the panels I attended. I should note that “653. Cognitive Approaches to Literature: Are We Beyond Science Envy Yet?” was, with the Freud panel described below, the best attended of the panels I sat in on (I’ll leave the implied contrast between these two panels to your imagination); but I was primarily interested in trying to understand exactly what a “Cognitive Approach to Literature” would be, that I didn’t really take any notes. Should any of the mentioned below find this page and wish to amend/change/contest anything I say below, please let me know in the comments. I’m happy to amend the post as needed. Indeed, going over my notes, I learned that I probably need to take better notes in the future… But if nothing else, these notes may, through the deliberate serendipity of Google, allow some folks to find one another.

Panels

  • 150. Unboxing Modernism: Beyond the Divides”: Introducing this panel, Melba Cuddy-Keane provided a brief outline of the development of modernist studies from 1970s to the present, from the consolidation of definitions of modernism in terms of formal experimentalization, to the recognition of the exclusions of such formulations (broadly speaking, this narrative seems applicable to literary studies as a whole). Our own period, she suggests, is one of refusing of closure—of attempting to keep the very definition of modernism open. The panelists, she suggests, offer visions of how this might be achieved.

    Broadly speaking, the panelists seemed to split into two groups: Ann Ardis and Michael Leja were interested in locating modernism within a larger frame of cultural reference, taking modernism out of the hermetically sealed “box” of high culture (to use the somewhat abused metaphor dominating the panel). Leja was interested in showing the similarities between modernist art (construed broadly enough to include abstract expressionism) and larger developments in visual culture. Ardis discussed periodical studies as providing one avenue that can enrich our understanding of the period, by forcing us to return to the complexity of the primary source. She mentioned anonymous/pseudonymous/collective authorship, and the complex international circulation of such periodicals, as obvious areas of interest. Anita Patterson and Steven Yao were interested in challenging the geography of modernism, locating modernism within a transnational framework. Patterson’s work focuses on modernist poets connected to the Americas (Jules Laforgue, St. John Perse, Wilson Harris). Yao’s work focuses on the Pacific, particularly with the fascination of some modernists with translating works they could not really read (all those poems “from the Chinese”).

    In the comments, the provocative question of whether “modernism” was even a valuable term anymore was raised. Panelists did not seem to come to any consensus about this important question, and (alack!) the panel ended before it was fully pursued.

    The panelists also provided a helpful run down of some of the most interesting recent works in modernist studies. Among the works mentioned were:

    • Christopher Bush, Ideographic Modernism: China, Writing, Media(Oxford Univ. Press, 2010)
    • Pacific Rim Modernisms, edited by Mary Ann Gilles, Helen Sword, and Steven Yao (Univ. of Toronto Press, 2009)
    • Lesley Wheeler, Voicing American Poetry: Sound and Performance from the 1920s to the Present (Cornell Univ. Press, 2008)
    • Pericles Lewis, Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010)
  • 235. Law and the Modernist Atlantic: These three papers all considered some aspect of modernism’s (broadly construed) encounter with “the law.” Lisa Fluet’s paper “‘Liberal Fascism,’ Human Rights, and the State: On H.G. Wells” pursued the imagining of the state in the work of H. G. Wells. While the state has tended to be an object of critique in leftist and Foucauldian narrative, Wells’s narrative, she suggests, offers a way of imagining the state more positively. Unlike figures like Henry James or Virginia Woolf, concerned with recording subjective experience (“how the world feels”), Wells offers something like a “novel of information” (Fluet here borrows James Wood’s term, describing the contemporary novel) concerned with describing how the world actually works. For Fluet, Wells’s work offers an important opportunity to do what the novels of James and Woolf cannot do—imagine the state.

    Kelly McDowell’s “The Perverse ‘Look’ of the Law: Ulysses and Obscenity” offered a close, theoretically informed reading of “Nausicaa” episode. The episode’s representation of Gerty MacDowell and Leopold Bloom demonstrate the perversity inherent in the law itself. The normativity of the law itself, in the interacting gazes of Bloom and Gerty, undermines itself. McDowell closed by reading the logic of the “Nausicaa” chapter into the obscenity trials that it sparked.

    Thomas Cohen offered a fascinating look at Kathy Acker’s literary appropriations, and the legal controversy, by looking at Acker’s text “Dead Doll Humility.” Drawing on Lyotard’s notion of the differnd, Cohen traced the conflict between experimental writing and intellectual property in Acker’s work. Cohen helpfully quotes Geoffery Bennington on Lyotard: “an accusation of theft might well also involve a diffénd, if one of the parties does not recognize that the object in question is a legitimate object of property.” Such, Cohen suggests, is the case with Acker’s appropriations/plagiarisms of four pages of Harold Robbins’s The Pirate in Acker’s “The Adult Life of Toulouse Lautrec” (“Dead Doll Humility” responds to the controversy which followed this plagiarism).

  • 294. The Death of Freud?: This was the most crowded panel I attended. The second panelist was unable to attend because of illness, allowing Jean-Michel Rabatè to speak at length. His paper, entitled “What is to be preferred, Death of Obsolecence?”, provided a fascinating meditation on the place of death in Freud’s work. Rabaté began by contrasting his two titular terms, obsolescence being a sort of incomplete, unsuccessful death. Freudian psychoanalysis, by midcentury, had been co-opted by a “weak adaptive culturalism,” (what Lacan decried in “ego-psychology”). Adorno and Lacan both sought to save psychoanalysis from this fate (cf. “In psychoanalysis nothing is true except the exaggerations” – Adorno; the entire Lacanian rereading of Freud). In this regard, death, indeed, seems preferable to obsolescence.

    From here Rabaté moved to a discussion of the changing place of death in Freud’s work. This preoccuptation with death begins early, in a set of letters written in Spanish to Edouard Silberstein. Indeed, Freud seems tohave taught himself at least passable Spanish in order to conduct this correspondence, which was inspired by Cervantes’s Dialogue of the Dogs. The letters are interesting because they are structued by an injunction similar to that of free association. They also, however, feature a prohibition on describing death (one is not to say that “One has died”; substituting instead some sort of euphemism). This correspondence, with its anticipation of free association, the obvious importance of language (it was conducted in Spanish), and its vexed relationship to death, provides a model for a set of issues which will continue to constellate in interesting ways throughout Freud’s work. (In its ambition to trace key themes throughout Freud’s work, and with death in particular, Rabaté’s talk reminded me frequently of Laplanche’s Life and Death in Psychoanalysis).

    This concern with death puts Freud in dialogue with the better part of nineteenth-century German philosophy: Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche. Rabaté continued to the famous discussion of death in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where precisely the question of the origin of death is broached explicitly. Is death an internal necessity or is it merely imposed from without? (This is the key question about whether a “death drive” exists.) In closing, he briefly discussed a thinker (about whom I knew nothing) who most emphatically believed that death was not a necessity: the Russian philosopher Nikolai Fyodorov, a resolutely anti-Heideggerian (and somewhat crazy) figure for whom death is a purely external phenomenon to be resisted (he proposed, as humanity’s key project, resurrecting everyone… yeah).

    In the Q&A period questions returned to panel’s titular question, trying to think about Freud’s continuing relevance through the psychoanalytic categories of mourning/melancholia, or the Derridean notion of ‘hauntology’ (preserving “a specter of Freud”). Rabatè responded by trying to move past these oft-referenced categories. “There is no ontology of psychoanalysis,” he insisted. Ontology itself is not a Freudian category; the concern with language, the concern with the Other in us (the work of culture), that is Freudian.

    (Oh, and I learned that Freud, like W. B. Yeats, had had a vasectomy—or Steinach procedure—in the belief that the procedure had rejuvenating effects.)

  • 364. D. H. Lawrence’s Short Stories: Beth McFarland-Wilson’s paper, “A Family Systems Interpretation of ‘Horse Dealer’s Daughter’” offered a reading of Lawrence’s story from the perspective of “family systems theory.” This approach allowed McFarland-Wilson’s reading to understand the story outside the terms of Oedipal desire that predominate in existing readings. Carrie Rohman’s “Ecology and the Creaturely in ‘Sun’” draws on Merleau-Ponty and reads the character Juliet, in “Sun,” as an experiment in the role of the irrational and the creaturely, a flight from humanism to a view of the subject as ecologically situated. The streaming “dark flow” between Juliet and the sun captures well the relationship between the body and the world that Merleau-Ponty describes as the “flesh of the world,” the perceiving body that is at once part of the world it perceives. Pamela K. Wright’s paper, “Till Death Do Us Part: The Implications of Illness, Disability, and Death on Love and Romance in Lawrence’s ‘The Blind Man’ and Somerset Maugham’s ‘Sanitorium’”, explored the role of disability in the two stories. Lawrence’s ‘The Blind Man’, Wright suggests, offers a more complex and sympathetic representation of the disabled body than that, for example, of Clifford Chatterley, whose disability comes to symbolized a broader cultural impotence.

  • 513. Joycean Materialities: Christy Burns’s “Circean Sense: Phenomenology in Joyce” examined the representation of sensate experience in Ulysses. Burns suggests that Stephen (on the beach in “Telemachus”), and Leopold Bloom on the beach later in Ulysses, offer two different attitudes toward the object world (Stephen’s disdain of brute materiality and Bloom’s immersion in the sensual world). “Circe,” in which objects themselves take on a life of their own, dramatizes the tension between these two different attitudes. David Earle’s fascinating “James Joyce, Gently Used: Republication and Dissemiation of Popular Modernism” contested the fetishization of the first-edition, to suggest that pulp editions of modernist works served a too-often ignored role in popularizing these works. Earle shared many fascinating popular versions of modernist texts, including an appearance of Joyce’s poems in American Girl (the periodical of the American Girl Scouts), and even mentioned the pulp edition of Bubu of Montparnasse, with an introduction by T. S. Eliot (which I’ve mentioned here). Sean Latham’s “Joyce’s Dirty Work” took as its object of analysis the literal dirt of “dear dirty Dublin” as an especially valuable way about thinking about the mongrel nature of the Irish nation as it emerges in the age of what Ulrich Beck calls the “risk society.”

  • 588. Copyright and the Modernist Atlantic: Versions of the three papers from this panel will all appear in a forthcoming volume, Modernism and Copyright, edited by Paul Saint-Amour. Robert Spoo’s “Copyright Deformations and the Transatlantic Publishing Scene” offered a historically rich account of the complex ways copyright impacted modernist literature. The US in this period (and until 1989) did not participate in the Berne Convention which establishes international copyright standards. Instead, to claim a copyright in the United States, a book had to be published/printed in the United States (the “manufacturing clause” of US copyright). Informally, “courtesy of the trade” prevented rampant piracy, but this informal system withered in the early years of the twentieth century as new publishers emerged, and a more competitive publishing environment developed. Joseph Slaughter’s “Plagiarism, Promiscuous Translation, and Yambo Ouologuem’s Primitivism: or, The Following Takes Place (Again) between 12am and 1am, 14 July 1913,” began by comparing two different translations of Oulouguem’s Le Devoir de Violence (the long title makes sense). The 1971 translation by Ralph Manheim introduced allusions to Eliot and Dickinson in the novel (replacing allusions in the original to Homer). These allusions became an object of controversy in discussions of the novel. Generally, Slaughter suggests, allusion becomes plagiarism when writer and reader are not able to share a common text/heritage/culture. In this way, the question of allusion/plagiarism in Ouloguem’s novel became a question of cultural authenticity—to what extent can an African novelist allude to Western canonicals works without being accused of plagiarism? Paul Saint-Amour’s “Modernism, Copyright, and the Counter Factual” suggests a shift in the concept of copyright during the twentieth century from the individual to the population, from the individualized logic of the author function to a more biopolitical logic. This shift in conceptualization of intellectual property, Saint-Amour suggests, and the counterfactual logic the law sometimes uses, are behind contemporary extensions of copyright. But they might also open up new avenues of contestation. For example, while some arguments for extending copyright terms rely on longer life expectancies, mightn’t this same logic suggest that copyright should expire sooner in those nations with lower life expectancies?

  • 612. The Legacy of David Foster Wallace: Why would I write this panel up, when Kathleen Fitzpatrick has already done a fantastic job?

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What is
there in being able
to say that one has dominated the stream in an attitude of self-defense;
in proving that one has had the experience
of carrying a stick?

– Marianne Moore, “Critics and Connoisseurs”

This post made possible with materials from The Peter Kavanagh Papers (1960), Special Collections, University of Virginia.

New York Times (Jan. 17, 1960)

New York Times (Jan. 17, 1960)

And what is there in being able to say that one has laboriously memorized a text, set it in type by hand on a jury rigged press, printed it, and then destroyed the copies by cutting them in half? That is the question raised by the bizarre story of Peter Kavanagh’s short collection of John Quinn’s letters, The Letters of John Quinn: A Pandect, a book that now only exists (or almost only exists) as a sort of Borgesian idea of a book.

Peter Kavanagh was an Irish scholar (PhD from Trinity) who moved to the U.S. and who is most famous (if famous at all) for being the brother, and occasional publisher, of the poet Patrick Kavanagh. In January of 1960, however, for the briefest of moments, Peter Kavanagh rose to popular culture prominence for violating copyright in a particularly novel way.

Quinn “published” The Letters of John Quinn: A Pandect, which gathered excerpts from the collection of Quinn’s letters stored in the New York Public Library. A lawyer and collector or art and manuscripts, Quinn is an important figure in the early history of modernism, particularly American modernism: he was crucially involved in the 1913 Armory show (lobbying Congress to remove import duties on art so that the exhibition would be feasible); he was friends with Ezra Pound and an early and ardent defender of Joyce; he was the legal defense for the Little Review which published serialized extracts of Ulysses; T. S. Eliot was so appreciative of of Quinn’s help that he gave the manuscript of The Waste Land to Quinn (it is this copy which, by a circuitous route, ultimately was published as the facsimile edition).

Quinn was an early supporter of modernism across the arts, and his letters are invaluable to scholars of modernism. In addition to the figures already mentioned, Quinn corresponded with Yeats, Augustus John, Jacob Epstein, Marcel Duchamp, Joseph Conrad, and many (many) others.

The New York Library’s collection of these letters was open to be consulted by scholars; the library, however, required that individuals consulting the letters sign a contract that stipulated that none of the letters could be published until 1988. Kavanagh signed this contract but then copied the letters–by memorizing them. Newspapers did their best to sensationalize the story with headlines like “Purloined Letters? Intrigue in the Library” and “Coup By Printer Outwits Library” (Jan 17, 1960, New York Times), or (my favorite) “Uses Memory to Break Thru Library ‘Wall’” (Jan. 18, 1960, Chicago Daily Tribune). The stories all mixed, in varying proportions, the image of Kavanagh as a poor Irish academic (an “impoverished Irish scholar” [NYT April 23, 1961], even “a pauper-scholar” in one story [NYT Jun 6, 1965]), the strange feat of memorization he managed to perform, and the enormous labor to which he went to print this volume.

Quinn was not, however, possessed of a superhuman memory; instead, each day for two weeks, Quinn entered the library’s reading room, found a letter worthy of being reproduced, read it for an hour, stepped outside, and hastily regurgitated it into a ten cent notebook (all the papers refer to these notebooks as “ten cent” notebooks), before returning to the reading room to start again. Kavanagh describes it this way in his autobiography,

The information contained in the letters was so startling that it was easily remembered–what Joseph Conrad said, what Roger Casemant said, what Matisse said, and the rest. At the end of each hour’s reading I went outside and wrote down what I remembered, then returned for another memory session. After two weeks I had completed the reading of all the letters, several million words. (Beyond 174)

Any violation of copyright is not the most immediate legal issue. In reproducing the letters Kavanagh is violated the contract he signed to gain access to the collection. His edition of The Letters of John Quinn clearly violates that contract, regardless of whether it violates copyright, which, of course, it also clearly does. Indeed the letters are both to and from Quinn, so Kavanagh is conceivably violating dozens of copyrights. But, in press accounts, Kavanagh was nevertheless frequently described as violating copyright, and (just as often) as a “pirate,” or his edition as a “bootleg” edition.

Kavanagh himself offered a number of defenses of his actions. The library’s contract had, Kavanagh suggests, “intimidated the few” people who had been able to read them, and (in Kavanagh’s estimation) resulted in “John Quinn’s contribution to twentieth century art and literature being totally forgotten, even by scholars” (“Introduction”). Kavanagh, however, would not be intimated. In the document that would have been the introduction to the letters, he writes,

The author, feeling no sense of intimidation, has decided that it is important that the information in these letters be widely known. Since these letters are open to inspection and reading by all students of literature they have relinquished their private feature and in fact are already published. (“Introduction”)

The suggestion that availability in an archive is the same as publication is unlikely to convince anyone. Elsewhere Kavanagh makes a similar point, noting that while, contractually, you could not “publish” the letters in the archive, nothing prohibited one “from going out on the street telling everyone they chose what they had read” (Beyond 173).

Many years later, in his 1977 autobiography Beyond Affection, Kavanagh gives a very different justification, accusing the New York Public Library of illegitimately overextending its control of the letters. He writes, “For reasons, perhaps legal, perhaps vanity, the New York Public Library had the terms of the will changed directing that these letters not to be published until seventy years after his death” (Beyond 173). The only news report (I’ve come across) that backs up this claim is from the April 23, 1961 New York Times, which quotes Quinn’s will and notes the 1988 date was a product of a court decision made in 1935. While it is not entirely clear from this account, it seems as though the prohibition on publication before 1988 was not Quinn’s request. Quinn even recommends in his will that “a selection of autograph letters to me” may be made and “published in one or two volumes as a possibly interesting record of literary and artistic history.” Crucially, however, Quinn (lawyer that he is) understands the complicated copyright issues attending correspondence; such a volume would be published “with the consent of of the writers living.”

Regardless of the justification he offers, Kavanagh saw his edition of Quinn’s letters as an act of resistance to a silly and unjust law, in defense of Quinn himself. “Quinn,” Kavangh explained to the Washington Post, “is the absolute key to the 20th Century art and literature [sic], as far as one man can be a key. Yet he’s totally forgotten…” (WP Jan 18, 1960). In this sense, Kavanagh saw himself as defending Quinn, not as violating Quinn’s wishes. At times, Kavanagh’s argument sounds almost delusional. “If [Quinn] had not wanted these letters to be published he would have had them locked up for 50 years”–if this is not a particularly convincing suggestion, the next step is just amazing–”I conclude that he must have left a loophole–he was a lawyer–for such a person as myself” (WP Jan 18, 1960).

By a “loophole,” Kavanagh here presumably means his way of copying the letters from memory rather than some other, more direct, form of copying, and thereby getting around the library’s attempt to prevent the letters from being published. But Kavanagh’s edition enacts a more forceful response to copyright in its very materiality.

Kavanagh’s bold claim that, by virtue of being publicly available, the letters were already effectively published is unlikely to convince many lawyers. It does, however, raise the larger question of what precisely constitutes publication. The letters themselves had already been copied once. Quinn sold the original letters, leaving the library copies of them. So what separates why are some copies violations and others not? Or, what separates a good copy from a bad copy?

Here is where the specifics of Kavanagh’s edition become particularly fascinating. In addition to Kavanagh’s odd protocols for acquiring the text through a method of mnemic binge and purge, newspaper stories uniformly stressed a second aspect of his edition of Quinn’s letters–that he printed them entirely himself. That is, the small edition (of 129 copies) was printed and bound by hand, by Kavanagh on a press that he had built entirely himself.

Kavanagh at his press, from Jan 17, 1960 <em>New York Times</em>

Kavanagh at his press, from Jan 17, 1960 New York Times

The Washington Post described the press like this: “Kavanagh set up his printing press in his two-room East 29th street flat. With a sewing machine as for a base, the homemade press parts include a ship’s wheel, a big automobile jack, strips of tin from gasoline cans, the hinges of a typewriter case, and a section of a broom handle” (WP Jan 18, 1960).

Kavanagh’s own description of the press, in his autobiography, reveals that the process of getting this apparatus working was quite arduous. Frustrated with traditional publishing avenues, Kavanagh decided to do it all himself. “I regarded it as an outrage that any man of genius should be dependent on the ordinary commercial publisher to issue his work. There should be some more civilized way to make his work known” (Beyond 167). (This hubris is mitigated somewhat when we recall that the “man of genius” to which Kavanagh refers is more likely his brother than himself.) Kavanagh built the press from available materials, using scrap wood for key structural elements; but when Kavanagh tried to use the press, the wood broke when sufficient pressure (using the car jack!) was applied to get a good impression. So he replaces some parts with steel that he purchases from an ironworks. This simply shifts the pressure, and another wooden piece breaks. Too embarrassed to return to the ironworks and “the jeers of the iron merchant,” Kavanagh happens upon a piece of scrap steel as he drives down Fifth Avenue one morning, near the site of “the new Guggenheim Museum” (Beyond 170).

Kavanagh’s press was thus built up of the detritus of his meager urban existence.

While there is no legal relevance to this hacked-together press, the enormous labor Kavanagh poured into his edition of Quinn’s letters stands as part of an implicit argument embodied in the text itself. Beyond building the press himself, the work of printing the text on such a device was equally taxing; “it took weeks of seventeen-hour days to produce” (NYT Jan 26, 1960). Kavanagh had planned on selling 100 copies of the edition to collectors for costing $35 each (in 2009 dollars that is, the inflation calculator informs me, $252.87)–a pricy book, but not enough to make Kavanagh rich; indeed, it seems clear that financial gain was not Kavanagh’s main goal.

This labor, out of all proportion to any possible profit, seems to mitigate the criminality of Kavanagh’s violation of both contract and copyright. He may indeed be a pirate, but he is a decidedly sympathetic pirate. And he found plenty of sympathy. A New York Times editorial, without taking Kavanagh’s side against the library, presents Kavanagh as a respectable figure with laudable goals–”Everybody is right” in the dispute between Kavanagh and the library the editorial suggests (NYT Jan. 22, 1960). A letter to the Times argues that the library should buy the entire edition from Kavanagh (NYT Jan. 25, 1960). And, while he is hardly an objective source, Kavanagh in his autobiography quotes from some of the many supportive letters he received.

Kavanagh largely earned this sympathy by eschewing any sense of material benefit. Kavanagh’s edition of Quinn’s letters, as a material object and a product of labor, refutes the legalistic, intellectual property claims of the library levelled against him. Leveraging the craftsmanship of the text, Kavanagh appeals to the basic intuition that people should be the owners of their own labor. After the enormous work of memorizing and self-printing his edition, should it really be scrapped because it violates the library’s contractual rights over the text, divorced completely from either authorship or labor?

Intellectual property law attempts to preserve the intangible labor of writers and others through a discourse of rights. Kavanagh’s edition, understood as a gesture, represents a clearly tangible object; but by so consistently resisting the larger alienating mechanisms of publishing, by so solitarily laboring the produce the actual book itself, Kavanagh attempts to refocus the question of publication not on rights, but on who has earned control of a text. (I don’t pretend that this is a good alternative to copyright). By thus highlighting the labor that produced the edition, Kavanagh seeks to align himself with Quinn as a creator of value rather than a bearer of rights. This alignment is equally evident in Kavanagh’s own (sometimes strained) claims to be working on Quinn’s behalf. In performing what, from any perspective, is likely to look like an irrational, pointless, fanatical sort of labor, Kavanagh is able to disburden himself (at least) of the image of the self-interested pirate seeking profit. The description Kavanagh offers of Quinn is likely to remind of Kavanagh’s own quixotic project: “All this he did without thought of personal gain” (“Introduction”).

New York Times, Jan. 26, 1960

Kavanagh with his Press, and Remnants his Work

Ultimately, Kavanagh settled with the library without going through a trial. Deciding to not undertake a protracted legal proceeding, Kavanagh destroyed nearly every copy of The Letters of John Quinn. Kavanagh managed to make his point one final time; he brought with him into court a bag which he then held over his head, and from which tumbled the remnants of the 117 copies of The Letters of John Quinn. Kavanagh had used a cobbler’s knife (he also made his own shoes, crafty fellow) to cut (nearly) the entire run in half. “Mr Kavanagh gave the court the bound side of the books only. He kept the other halves for himself, explaining that he did so to prevent the books from being pieced together” (NYT Jan 26, 1960). Kavanagh here ironically insists that he cannot turn over both halves of the books to the court, because they might reconstruct the whole edition.

Kavanagh here plays out just one more variation of the question that motivated the entire controversy–what is a text and who should own it? (Is, for instance, one half of a book that has been cut apart by a knife a text?). A few copies escaped the cobbler’s knife: Kavanagh was allowed to keep two copies for his own consultation (but which were to be returned to the library upon Kavanagh’s death), and one was sent to the British Library. Kavanagh treated the outcome as a success. “I’ve made my point,” he told the New York Times. “To me, the act is everything” (NYT, Jan. 21, 1960). The act, the thing done, obeys a logic quite different from that of rights.

For Kavanagh that is how the story ends, but technically the story doesn’t end here. Before he used a knife to destroy the full print run, Kavanagh had given nine copies to Padric Farrell. Farrell was not particularly interested in restoring Quinn’s reputation, or in laboriously setting an edition of letters in type by hand; but he was interested in the legal issues surrounding who owns/controls manuscript materials. And when Kavanagh decided not to pursue the matter in court, Farrell teamed up with Morris Ernst (the lawyer who had successfully defended Ulysses before Judge Woolsey) to press onward (ultimately winning the right to keep all but one of the nine copies).

(In what is certainly the most interesting anecdote from Farrell’s involvement, when the court first learned of Farrell’s nine copies, sheriffs were sent to his apartment to collect them; the nine copies were rescued by Farrell’s wife Elsa de Brun, the Swedish painter also known as Nuala, who hid them in her jacket, snuck out of the apartment past the police, and took refuge–I am not kidding–in the home of Teddy Roosevelt’s daughter-in-law [NYT April 23, 1961]. Farrell would later claim that he had told Kavanagh to pirate the Quinn letters [NYT July 27, 1988]; Kavanagh’s autobiography suggests no such thing.)

Bibliography

  • Peter Kavanagh, Beyond Affection: An Autobiography (NY: Peter Kavanagh Hand Press, 1977).
  • Peter Kavanagh, “Introduction” to The John Quinn Letters: A Pandect, Papers of Peter Kavanagh (1960), Special Collections, University of Virginia Library.
  • “Purloined Letters? Intrigue in the Library,” by McCandlish Phillips, New York Times, Jan 17, 1960.
  • “Irishman with Memory and a Press ‘Pirates’ Letters of Patrons of Arts,” Washington Post, Jan 18, 1960.
  • “Disposition of the Quinn Letters,” letter to New York Times, by Paul Holister, Jan 17, 1960.
  • “Uses Memory to Break Thru ‘Wall,’” Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 18, 1960.
  • “Library Summons Printer to Court,” by McCandlish Phillips, New York Times, Jan. 21, 1960.
  • “Mr. Quinn’s Letters,” editorial, New York Times, Jan. 22, 1960.
  • “Court Gets the Purloined Letters,” by McCandlish Phillips, New York Times Jan 26, 1960.
  • “Case of Purloined Letters is Resolved by Public Library,” by McCandlish Phillips, New York Times, April 23, 1961.
  • “A Son of Ireland Makes his First Visit There,” by McCandlish Phillips, New York Times, June 6, 1965.
  • “About New York: A Printer with the Proper Respect for the Poet’s Art,” by William Farrell, New York Times, Feb. 14, 1981.